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<A>ABSTRACT 
Agency has attracted considerable attention, especially of late. Nevertheless, perceptions of 
language learners as nonagentive persist. In this article the Douglas Fir Group‘s call for a 
transdisciplinary perspective is heeded in a Complex Dynamic Systems Theory‘s (CDST) 
conceptualization of agency. It is suggested that CDST maintains the structure–agency 
complementarity while bringing to the fore the relational and emergent nature of agency. 
Coordination dynamics is identified as a possible mechanism for the phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic emergence of agency. CDST further characterizes agency as spatially-temporally 
situated. It can be achieved and changed through iteration and co-adaptation. It is also 
multidimensional and heterarchical.  
In this era of posthumanism, an issue that is also taken up is whether it is only humans 
who have agency. The article then discusses educational practices that could support learner 
agency. Finally, the article closes with a discussion of agency and ethical action.  
<END OF ABSTRACT> 
Keywords: agency; Complex Dynamic Systems Theory; relational; emergent; heterarchy; 
teaching practices; ethics 
 
We live in tumultuous times. Many feel disempowered by policies, actions, and forces over 
which they have little or no say and certainly no control. With literal and virtual walls being 
constructed around the world to prevent the entry of thousands of people seeking refuge from 
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regions suffering environmental degradation, economic deprivation, violence, and war, ―these 
days are dark‖ (Henry Giroux at the AERA Conference, 14 April 2018). Ortega (2017) 
remarked recently that ―(. . .) the world is witnessing serious deterioration of solidarity and 
respect for human diversity‖ (p. 1). Indeed, with the rise of populism within the United 
States, some of the hard-won political and social gains of the past few decades are eroding. 
On a still more local level, scholarship itself is under attack, and scholars who challenge 
authority (e.g., climate scientists in the United States) find their work subject to attempts to 
delegitimize it. 
It is no wonder, then, that academics from a number of disciplines have shown new 
interest on the topic in an attempt to reclaim their own agency. To this point, Ahearn (2001) 
observes that social movements in recent decades have encouraged scholarship on agency 
(cited in Miller, 2014), and clearly this increased interest in agency is also evident in our field 
in the form of monographs (Deters, 2011; Gao, 2010; Miller, 2014; Vitanova, 2010), 
anthologies (Benson & Cooker, 2013; Deters et al., 2015; Murray, Gao, & Lamb, 2011), 
numerous articles (e.g., five articles on parent and teacher agency in affecting language 
education and language revitalization were posted online in July/August 2018 in the open-
access journal Language, Culture and Curriculum), and conference presentations. In some of 
these cases, agency has been associated, and even conflated, with free will, consciousness, 
identity, autonomy, and empowerment;
1
 in other cases, agency is said to extend to nonliving 
entities.  
At times, agency has been characterized as a personal feature of individuals. Given 
the state of the world, as I have just depicted, one can rightfully ask, when people‘s personal 
data is up for sale, how much room is there for individual agency? The answer is that 
individual agency can only be understood in relation to the material and social world and 
what it affords or denies (e.g., Goller, 2017). As Goller, paraphrasing Emirbayer and Mische 
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(1998), writes, ―(. . .) agency can only be captured in its full complexity if it is situated within 
the flow of time and takes into account relational and structural aspects toward which 
participants can assume different orientations‖ (p. 447). 
Thus, while I acknowledge the contextual (including social, spatial, material, cultural, 
temporal, relational, and structural) embeddedness of agency, I also assume that learners can 
adopt different ―orientations‖ to it. This is an important point in light of a theme in the 2016 
Douglas Fir Group‘s (hereafter DFG) article that while learners‘ ―understandings are to a 
great extent shaped by larger social institutional expectations, they, as individual agents, also 
play a vital role in shaping them‖ (p. 33). One of my purposes for writing this article, then, is 
to expand on this DFG theme. In so doing, I adopt Evan Thompson‘s definition (on-line 
interview by Heuman, 2014): ―agency is the capacity to act in the world.‖ More specifically, 
following the DFG‘s lead, I use it here to refer to optimizing conditions for one‘s own 
learning (or not—Duff & Doherty, 2015) and choosing to deploy one‘s semiotic resources to 
position oneself as one would wish in a multilingual world (Byrnes, 2014).  
While the theme of agency has been pursued in anthropology, biology, philosophy, 
psychology, and sociology, among other disciplines, in keeping with the DFG‘s call for 
transdisciplinary approaches, I enlist the help of Complex Dynamic Systems Theory (CDST) 
in investigating agency in this article. CDST qualifies as transdisciplinary in two ways. First, 
CDST ―represents an important challenge to the disciplinary silos of the twentieth-first-
century academy‖ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p. 3). Indeed, Byrne and Callaghan, among 
others (see Larsen–Freeman & Freeman, 2008), assert that complexity science is central to 
the foundation of a post-disciplinary research program. Second, besides respecting, but 
moving beyond disciplinary boundaries (Morin, 2008), CDST introduces new cross-cutting, 
transcendent intellectual themes (Halliday & Burns, 2006; Hult, 2010a; Larsen–Freeman, 
2012a), on which I draw in this article.   
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First, though, I address my long-standing personal concern about learner agency, 
which was a second motivation for my writing this article. My third purpose was to show the 
value of extending insights afforded by CDST from the natural world to the human one. I 
suggest how CDST introduces a mechanism to account for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
development of human agency. I also contend that CDST endorses several perspectives on 
agency that stem from different disciplines, and, as a result, it may contribute a coherence to 
the discussion of agency. Then, I touch upon what agency might look like in a posthumanist 
world. I conclude with thoughts on how this understanding plays out in education and how it 
demands ethical actions. 
 
<A>CONSTRUING LEARNERS AS NONAGENTIVE 
As I have written, work on agency has become more prevalent in recent times; 
however, I have been concerned about second language learners‘ construal as nonagentive for 
a long time (e.g., Larsen–Freeman, 1983; 2002b; 2012b; see also Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001), 
especially given that learner agency is fundamental to success (McLoughlin, 2016). At least 
implicit claims about the nonagentive status of second language learners have been made 
from a number of different perspectives on second language development:
2 
1. Developmental—that there are universal acquisition orders (the result of a built-in 
syllabus) and developmental sequences, which all learners follow. 
2. Pedagogical—that task-as-plan can be equated with learner performance on task when 
enacted (Coughlan & Duff, 1994); that learners need comprehensible input to be provided 
for them.  
3. Social—that young learners can be passively socialized into the communities in which 
they live (Duff & Doherty, 2014). 
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4. Categorical—that individuals are categorizable, while disregarding their intra-category 
differences (and thus changing how we interact with them and how they think of 
themselves) (Thompson regarding Hacking‘s 2006 ―looping effect‖ and ―making up 
people‖).3 
5. Statistical—that we can capture what is happening with individuals by simply 
aggregating data on these individuals (Molenaar, 2008; van Geert, 2011). 
6. Teleological—that language is a closed teleological system (which encourages deficit 
thinking, e.g., Larsen–Freeman, 2006a; 2014). 
7. Ideological—that the language or dialect of minoritized populations is unacceptable.  
Let me make clear my position: I do believe we humans are social beings. 
Communion with others is essential to our survival as individuals. Also, I recognize the need 
to guard against an ethos of individualism and neoliberalism (e.g., Ayn Rand), and I am 
aware that SLA‘s social turn was in part a rejection of the individualism of ‗mainstream‘ 
SLA theories (Benson, 2017). I do not wish to be overly agentive (Block, 2013), I am not a 
Cartesian dualist, pitting the social against the individual, and I do not discount collective 
agency. Nor do I reject the posthumanists‘ charge that agency is not exclusively human. 
Finally, I recognize that I am a product of my own noncollectivist culture, and I am aware of 
my privileged status within it. For instance, a ―common aspirational narrative‖ (Condoleezza 
Rice, PBS special ―American Creed,‖ broadcast 27 February 2018) no doubt influences my 
sense of agency.
4 
I should also acknowledge that even when limiting the discussion of agency to 
language development, for subaltern populations,
5
 the feeling of being disregarded is not 
new. For instance, Mick (2015) points out that there are few languages that have legitimated 
status within educational institutions, and raciolinguists have argued that the matter of which 
languages enjoy this status is based on geopolitical and economic factors. Then, too, 
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indigenous populations have long witnessed the assault on their languages by settler-
colonists. It is equally well-known that the playing field is not level when it comes to 
resources that support additional language learning. For instance, power imbalances deny 
some easy access to speakers of the target language (Norton, 2000; Pavlenko, 2001; Zuengler 
& Miller, 2006), and economic and racial inequality means that members of the majority 
communities have more opportunities for language study than do others (Larsen–Freeman & 
Tedick, 2016). However, ―being positioned as disempowered is not the same as having no 
agency‖ (Miller, 2014, p. 9), a point which Norton Peirce‘s (1995) research amply 
demonstrates. Individuals whom we might regard as less powerful in relation to dominant 
social groups are not necessarily lacking agency. Nonetheless, it is important not to lose sight 
of the fact that having agency and having choices is linked. 
Claire Kramsch (2012) has written, ―We are free to act but at the same time are not in 
control of the choices that are given to us‖ (p. 15). Judith Butler (2016) asserts ―We are called 
names and find ourselves living in a world of categories and descriptions way before we start 
to sort them critically and endeavour to change or make them on our own. In this way, we 
are, quite in spite of ourselves, vulnerable to, and affected by, discourses that we never 
chose‖ (p. 24). It is no doubt true that our agency is more limited than we are aware of due to 
the asymmetries of affordances (Dufva & Aro, 2015). As agents in multiple, nested, complex 
systems, the decisions that we make as individuals cannot help but be influenced by our 
connections with all kinds of social groupings (see Hall, 2019, this issue).  
However, while acknowledging this reality, we must also leave scope for individual 
agency and avoid masking differences in agency exercised by members of particular social 
groups (e.g., McKay & Wong, 1996). We must not overlook the learning paths that 
individuals take. Although second language development is rightly seen to be embedded in a 
larger sociohistorical ecological system, languaging is still performed by an agentive learner 
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in particular in a specific place (García & Flores, 2014) for particular reasons with particular 
others. We must attend to this level of granularity as well, a level of granularity that needs 
more attention by the DFG (Han, 2016).   
As Vitanova (2002, p. 216) observes, ―to Bakhtin, discourses do not automatically 
position individuals; rather, individuals actively use speech genres to orient themselves in 
relationships and interactions. This model of agency is both dialogical and creative for it lies 
in particular people‘s creative responses to particular situations at a particular time‖ (cited in 
Deters, 2011, p. 24).  
Indeed, sometimes particular people, known only by one name—Julie, Wes, Bob, 
Valerio—have been powerful correctives to prevailing SLA theories at the time they were 
studied: Ioup et al.‘s (1994) Julie, an adult native speaker of British English  living in Cairo, 
who appeared to speak Egyptian Arabic in a way virtually indistinguishable from native 
speakers of Arabic, presented as counter-evidence to the Critical Period Hypothesis; 
Schmidt‘s (1983) Wes, a native speaker of Japanese living in Hawai‘i, who, despite having 
considerable comprehensible input and social proximity to English speakers, never appeared 
to make progress in speaking English grammatically; Liu‘s Bob, a Chinese speaker learning 
English, whose use of particular questions in specific interactional contexts overrode any 
putative universal sequence of acquisition (Tarone & Liu, 1995). Along these same lines, 
there is Eskildsen‘s (2012) Spanish-speaking Valerio, whose use of negative English 
constructions to accomplish locally contextualized interactional goals departed from 
established developmental sequences, thus calling them into question. And there have been 
others: For example, Norton‘s (1995) account of Eva who, by challenging her subject 
position, was able to reject the way she was positioned and excluded by others in her 
workplace.  
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Thus, while there may be a long-standing debate over the primacy of structure or 
agency in shaping human behavior (see Archer in Brock, Carrigan, & Scambler, 2017), I 
think it well to remember, as Carter and Sealey (2000) argue, 
[t]oo great an emphasis on structures denies actors any power and fails to 
account for human beings making a difference. Too great an emphasis on 
agency overlooks the (. . .) very real constraints acting on us in time and 
space. And reducing each to merely a manifestation of the other (. . .) 
necessarily results in a theory which is unable to capture the complex 
relations between them. (p. 11)  
 
<A>COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEMS THEORY AND AGENCY 
Various theories have been invoked to account for agency: performativity theory (e.g., 
Miller, 2014), sociocultural theory (e.g., Arievitch, 2017; García, 2014), sociocognitive 
theory (e.g., Dufva & Aro, 2015); critical realism (e.g., Block, 2015; Boucher, 2018), and 
others. Each makes its contribution, and I do not wish to argue for a synthesis nor do I want 
to encourage a competition. As McLoughlin (2016) has observed: No one theoretical model 
seems able to completely capture the role of agency in second language acquisition—
admittedly even the one to which I am committed. And yet, one must ask: If we are to 
entertain a transdisciplinary perspective, which the DFG article encourages us to do, what 
would that be? It is noteworthy to me that the National Academies recently convened a group 
of leading complexity researchers to examine nine pressing global issues. These included 
examining whether the biosphere is sustainable, studying the robustness of power grids and 
disaster relief networks, and trying to determine how to exert control on the spread of disease 
(The National Academies, 2009, in Yoon, Goh, & Park, 2018). I submit that this convening 
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and others like it are an indication of the transdisciplinary reach of CDST and its applicability 
to both human and nonhuman affairs. 
Therefore, it will not surprise many when I say that one way to investigate the agency 
of language learners is through the transdisciplinarity of Complex Dynamic Systems Theory 
(CDST), which brings a relational, ecological systems lens to the study of agency. A 
relational system is ―an integrated whole whose essential properties cannot be reduced to 
those of its parts. They arise from the interactions and relationships between the parts‖ (Capra 
& Luisi, 2014, p. 10). What is important for the terms of this discussion, then, is to 
understand the dynamic relationship between social structure and agency as constituting an 
irreducible system, structure and agency never to be reconciled through the synthetic unity of 
Hegelian dialectism, all while the space in which the relationship is situated and the time at 
which it is situated ever changes. 
As the structure–agency coupled system moves through time and space, it can evolve 
in many directions, depending on its ―initial conditions,‖ which are always being updated. 
The same components in the system can have different effects, and different components can 
have the same effect; the latter phenomenon biologists refer to as ―degeneracy‖ and social 
scientists call ―epifinality.‖ 
As the components interact nonlinearly, patterns arise that could not have been 
anticipated from the components themselves. There is no central executive in a complex 
system; control is distributed. There is also no preformationism. The patterns are softly-
assembled to deal with the contingencies of the moment. With iteration (but not repetition), 
patterns are built up at different levels of scale (Agar, 2005; Hult, 2010b). The recurring 
patterns self-organize into attractors, regions in state space that a dynamic system tends to 
move, thus achieving some dynamic stability, never stasis. Moreover, a perturbation to the 
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system can move it out of its attractor basin, the region in which the attractor exerts a force, 
to a new trajectory, although it might simply return to its original attractor state. 
As the system moves through space-time, the agent and structure co-adapt, that is, the 
change is bi-directional and synchronous. What propels the change in humans is the 
reflexivity of which they are capable. ―This reflexivity results in a unique feedback path 
between the emergent structure and the individual agents – each agent being an observer of 
the structure he/she contributes to producing and the process of observation contributes to 
what emerges‖ (Goldspink & Kay, 2007, p. 12). More recently, Warren (2018) has added that 
―humans‘ intentional behavior is not only self-organized, but also adaptive: Agents harness 
dynamics and information in the service of goal-directed behavior.‖ 
Because complex systems change on multiple timescales and operate at different 
interacting levels of scale, I believe that a systems view can bring a nonreductionist scientific 
holism to the study of agency (Heylighen, Cilliers, & Gershenson, 2007). I realize that this 
description of CDST is far too synoptic for a first-time reader. For an interested party, there is 
a growing body of literature to consult, but I hope that I have provided a description 
sufficient to contextualize my subsequent remarks about agency.  
 
<B>Agency is Relational 
First, it seems to me that what CDST can contribute by way of expanding on the DFG 
article is the position that agency is relational. Agency is not inhered in a person. There is no 
homunculus or innate internal program that is responsible for the observed behavior. Instead, 
agency is interpellated from the self-organizing dynamic interaction of factors internal and 
external to the system, persisting only through their constant interaction with each other. In 
this account, the sense of agency is relational. It is not something ―derived from internal 
representations of our own action-related processes. Rather, it is essentially another 
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dimension of our relation with the world, and derives from the ways in which we establish, 
lose, and re-establish meaningful interactions between ourselves and our environment‖ 
(Buhrman & Di Paolo, 2017, p. 216). 
In discussing an enactivist approach, which is related to CDST, Shaun Gallagher 
(2017) underscores the idea that [agency] ―is not a property of one individual brain, mind, or 
organism, but is relational‖ (p. 3). Agency is always related to the affordances in the context, 
and thus inseparable from them, and affordances, in turn, are ecological rather than merely 
physical features of the world, defined in terms of the ‗systems‘ relationship between the 
organism and its environment (Ellis, 2019, this issue). 
 
<B>Agency is Emergent 
―The question of agency and directedness in living systems has puzzled philosophers 
and scientists for centuries. What principles and mechanisms underlie the emergence of 
agency?‖ complexity theorist Kelso (2016, p. 490) asks. In keeping with CDST, his answer 
lies in his concept of coordination dynamics (Larsen–Freeman, 2017b). Agency arises when 
spontaneous activity is coupled to the world, forming a coordinative structure (Kelso, 2016, 
pp. 491–492). Kelso (2016) states:  
A strong case can be made that coordinative structures (. . .) are units of 
selection in evolution (. . .) and intentional change (. . .) The ability of 
complex systems to softly assemble themselves into functional synergies or 
coordinative structures in a context-sensitive fashion offers significant 
selectional advantages. Coordinative structures are embodiments of the 
principle of functional equivalence (. . .): they handle the tremendous 
degeneracy of living things, using different combinations of elements and 
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recruiting new pathways ‗on the fly‘ to produce the same outcome (. . .) (p. 
492) 
Kelso (2016) offers a simple example of an infant‘s first experience of agency. He 
posits that agency emerges in humans at a very early age—say when a baby first becomes 
aware that it can make things happen; for example, by kicking its legs, it can make a mobile 
move or shaking its fist, a rattle sound. The coupled dynamics between the baby‘s 
movements (kinesthetic, visual, auditory, and emotional) and the consequences they produce 
constitute the first experience of agency for the infant. This may appear at first simply to be 
an example of stimulus–response learning, but Kelso suggests otherwise. ―What may have 
been missed (. . .) is the essence of what it means to be aware of oneself as a source of 
control, of doing something deliberately, and how this comes about‖ (p. 493). As he put it in 
May 2018, ―[The awareness of] making the world change is the origin of agency‖ (Kelso, 
2018). While Kelso‘s example of an infant with a mobile or rattle may be culture-bound, the 
point is that the perception of one‘s own agency depends on detecting spatiotemporal 
correlations between one‘s actions and its effects (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). ―[W]hen the 
baby‘s initially spontaneous movements cause the world to change, their perceived 
consequences have a sudden and sustained amplifying effect on the baby‘s further actions. 
This autocatalytic mechanism is continuous with our understanding of how biological form 
develops (. . .) and of the feedforward network motifs so ubiquitous in the design of 
biological circuits (. . .)‖ (Kelso, 2016, p. 492).  
It goes beyond the iteration of coordinative structures between a child‘s actions and 
its physical environment, of course. ―When a child‘s actions are treated by others as 
meaningful, the child is likely to repeat them and such actions become more habitual over 
time [. . .]‖ (Miller, 2014, p. 16); thus, ―[l]earners‘ agentive capacity should be understood to 
develop in relationship with others and with the world‖ (Miller, 2014, p. 142). Admittedly, it 
 13 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
is a stretch to go from a child kicking in its crib to the full agency of adult users of a 
language; nevertheless, the point should not be lost that it is in ―mundane social practices‖ 
that we become someone who is assigned and claims responsibility for particular actions 
(Miller‘s discussion of Davies (1990), pp. 11–12). Bagga–Gupta (2015) puts it this way: 
―Conceptualizing actors separated from the affordances offered in and through the 
communicative practice they co-construct in different settings would therefore comprise a 
reductionist view of the practice‖ (p. 128), and certainly such a comprisal would not be in 
keeping with CDST. Neither would an ahistorical account because a CDST adherent would 
maintain that an individual is ―an interactant shaping apperception (. . . in) an unfolding 
history of interaction with the world‖ (Hellerman, 2018, p. 42). 
 
<B>Agency is Spatially and Temporally Situated 
Agency, therefore, is not only about spatial ―settings‖ (Kramsch, 2018); agency is 
temporally situated as well. In keeping with this, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) propose that 
agency is influenced by the past, engagement with the present, and orientation to the future. 
Agency is thus temporally situated and ―both reproduces and transforms those structures in 
interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations‖ (p. 970). This 
accords with Scollon‘s (2001) nexus of practice position in which social actions carry history 
with them and what Pavlenko and Lantolf (2000) refer to as ―history in the present.‖ 
Just as a complex system can achieve relative stability, as evidenced by its self-
organizing attractor landscapes, agentive acts can achieve some stability, too, through the 
interplay between structure and agency. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) attribute the stability 
to ―the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, routinely 
incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and 
helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time‖ (p. 971). Biesta and 
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Tedder (2007) add a qualification: ―[p]articularly under the rapidly changing ‗external‘ 
circumstances of high or late modern societies, a substantial amount of effort may be needed 
to keep a situation relatively stable over time, and this requires agency as well, both in terms 
of orientation and action‖ (p. 136). 
Moreover, it is not only effortful reactivation that is responsible for the stabilizing and 
changing dynamic between agency and structure. It also lies in the ―the imaginative 
generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of 
thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors‘ hopes, fears, and 
desires for the future‖ (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 971). Nevertheless, although agency is 
involved with the past and the future, it can only ever be ―acted out‖ in the present, as Biesta 
and Tedder observe.  
Writing about language learner agency from a CDST perspective, Mercer (2012) 
states: ―Viewing agency holistically also implies considering it as temporally situated 
connecting together the dynamics of a person‘s ongoing life history including their past and 
present experiences as well as their future goals, expectations and imaginations‖ (p. 57). As a 
result, when we attribute agency to a learner, we understand that any relationship between 
and among the factors ―has to be understood as temporally situated, as creative with respect 
to antecedents and driven by local contingency‖ (Giorgi, 2012, p. 15).   
 
<B> Agency Can be Achieved 
Biesta and Tedder (2007) contribute an ecological perspective to their discussion of 
agency. They posit that agency is not a power that one has (see also, Miller, 2016), but rather 
is something one achieves by means of an environment, not simply in an environment (Biesta 
& Tedder, 2007, p. 137). The distinction between by means of and in is important because it 
reinforces the theme that agency is not something independent from structure. It further 
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allows not only for the fluctuation of agency over time, but also that the agent has recourse to 
change its agentive status, a point to which I shall return later in this article. However, as 
Biesta and Tedder (2007) caution,  
[t]o think of agency as achievement rather than as a ‗power‘ also helps to 
acknowledge that the achievement of agency depends on the availability 
of economic, cultural and social resources within a particular ecology. In 
this sense we can say that the achievement of agency will always result 
from the interplay of individual efforts, available resources and contextual 
and structural ‗factors‘ as they come together in particular and, in a sense, 
always unique situations. Methodologically an ecological approach to 
understanding agency thus focuses the attention on the unique 
configurations of such ‗factors.‘ (p. 137) 
 
<B>Agency Changes Through Iteration and Co-Adaptation 
CDST is essentially a theory of change. There are two mechanisms in accounting for 
change in complex systems: iteration and co-adaptation. Some years ago (Larsen–Freeman, 
2012c), I wrote about the former with regards to language change. Adopting a CDST 
perspective, I claimed that iteration produces the recurrent sequences found in language at the 
same time that it introduces change into a system. In a complex system, what results from one 
iteration is used as the starting point for the next iteration. Thus, the starting point or initial 
condition is always different, and the consequence is the system‘s mutability. As I noted 
earlier, however, iteration also provides some stability to the developing system due to the 
selective reactivation of certain past patterns (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). I suggested that 
iteration was a better term than repetition, arguing along with many others, that what we say 
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is never an exact repetition of what we or someone else has said (e.g., Derrida, 1976). 
Furthermore, I mused on why iteration was significant (Larsen–Freeman, 2012c): 
What would be the evolutionary advantage to someone of not repeating the 
same sound or word the same way twice? Well, first of all, not repeating the 
same word the same way creates options in our language resources that give 
us choices for how we want to make meaning, how we want to position 
ourselves, and how we want to express our identity or identities. In other 
words, iteration introduces heterogeneity. It opens up spaces. Iteration does 
not preserve the fidelity of the original, but only approximates it. In so doing, 
it includes in itself alterity (Deleuze, 2004). (p. 203) 
It seems to me that this same dynamic could account for change in agency (cf. Miller, 
2014). For Butler (1999) (whose work on iteration was brought to my attention by Tim 
McNamara [p.c., 2018]), ―the iterability of performativity is a theory of agency‖ (p. xxiv). 
And in his new book, McNamara (2019) makes a cogent argument along these same lines 
with regards to gender identity. It is in the slight difference that gender is enacted from one 
time to another, which makes transformation possible. 
In sum, according to CDST, iterative processes are responsible for two outcomes. 
First, stability comes from iterative processes, ―recurrent evolving responses to given 
situations,‖ yet second, these processes at the same time allow for ―emergence and situational 
contingency‖ (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2008, p. 383). 
The other mechanism of change in complex systems is co-adaptation. For instance, 
co-adaptation takes place in first language development between an infant and an ―other,‖ 
early on its caregiver. As a child and its caregiver interact, the language resources of each are 
dynamically altered, as each adapts to the other. CDS theorists refer to this as the ―coupling‖ 
of or co-adaptation between one complex system to another. Co-adaptation is an iterative 
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process, with each partner adjusting to the other over and over again. Pertinent to the present 
discussion, such adaptations lead to reciprocity between agency and structure. The 
dimensions of the structure constrain the actions that can be performed, and the actions that 
can be performed produce changes in the structure (Gibson, 1993). 
 
<B>Agency is Multidimensional 
Agency is not only about behavior. As Lantolf and Thorne (2006) have written, 
agency also ―entails the ability to assign relevance and significance to things and events‖ (p. 
143; also cited in Deters et al., 2015). In discussing the outcome of a football game, Sullivan 
and McCarthy (2004) refer to Rosaldo‘s (1986) example:  
Describing how the game is structured, its genesis in history, and how it 
functions in society might be extremely informative and interesting but would 
convey very little about what the game means for those involved. Football 
fans, for example, ―love‖ and are ―loyal‖ to their team and may even ―hate‖ 
the opposition. For them, this is a key part of what makes the game 
meaningful and what makes victory ―sweet‖ and defeat ―bitter.‖ We miss this 
kind of personal meaning unless we place feelings, emotions and values at 
the centre of our understanding. (p. 291) 
(cf. the joyous celebration that erupted after the Philadelphia Eagles‘ Super Bowl win in 
2018!) 
We see the multidimensionality of agency in Joana‘s (Mercer‘s 2012 research 
participant) agency, which is seen to be interlinked with a range of intrapersonal factors such 
as her emotions, beliefs about language learning, self-beliefs, personality, and motivation. 
Clearly, these all impact agency. Keysar (2018) has recently pointed to his research 
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concerning the emotional connection with one‘s language, and how such a connection affects 
the decisions that multilinguals make in how they deploy their available language resources. 
 
<B>Agency is Heterarchical  
Witherington and Lickliter (2016) observe ―dynamic systems proponents take as their 
ontological starting point systems of relations (. . .) with components necessarily defined in 
terms of relations with other components and the system as a whole (. . .)‖ (p. 214). 
Importantly, in a relational system, the components of the system do not form a hierarchy (cf. 
Figure 1 in the DFG article), and each component in a complex system can have a different 
spatial and temporal reach (Walby, 2007). In the place of a hierarchy, then, we might think in 
terms of a heterarchy, where due to homologous dynamics, influence extends in both/many 
directions among the components of a complex system, rather than top-down or bottom-up
6
 
and is always changing over time. This decentralized and multidimensional view of causality 
means that change is not caused by a single component, directly and linearly affecting 
another component, but can emerge from changes in relations within the system (Mercer, 
2018). 
Furthermore, the heterarchy is fractal, in that each feature of any one component 
applies to the other components of the system, in holographic fashion. Here, I am thinking of 
the features that I have highlighted in this article, namely, their relational, emergent, dynamic, 
etc. character. Finally, any depiction, such as Figure 1 in the DFG article, needs to capture the 
dynamism that exists among the components of the heterarchy.
7
  
 
<A>DO NONHUMAN SYSTEMS HAVE AGENCY? 
Some readers might object to my attempt at providing coherence to the study of 
agency by appealing to CDST as simply an exercise in renaming. While my intention was to 
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challenge the way that learners have been positioned nonagentively and to suggest a 
metadiscourse for discussing agency, I am sensitive to the fact that I may simply be 
analogizing. I have found some satisfaction, though, in discovering some convergence 
between CDST and previous research on agency, to which I have not been a contributor. I 
also know that CDST has afforded me a way of thinking about complex phenomena in our 
field (Larsen–Freeman, 2017b), and it is to illustrate this point that I turn next before 
concluding. 
 
<B>Agency in the Era of Posthumanism 
A question that has arisen is whether CDST, a theory that has originated in the 
physical sciences, can account for human agency.
8
 Brügge (1993), for example, insists that 
similarities between social processes and physical processes are misleading, rather than 
helpful. Then, too, some scholars in our field have rejected the notion that the laws of the 
physical world apply to humans. On the other hand, leading Dynamic Systems researchers 
Thelen and Smith (2006) comment that ―self-organization, nonlinearity, openness, stability, 
and change—all qualities of complex dynamic systems—are not confined to biological 
systems. They are also found in complex physical systems such as chemical reactions, global 
weather changes, mountain streams, clouds, dripping faucets— wherever many components 
form a coherent pattern and change over time‖ (pp. 267−268), and many of us use these 
images when we attempt to explain CDST concepts.  
Nowotny (2005) argues for the importance of transdisciplinary interfaces in which 
analyses of complex evolving systems are not to be left to scientists alone, since they 
increasingly turn out simultaneously to involve human agents and things, science and 
society‚ in novel configurations. Indeed, researchers who study physical systems and those 
who study human systems search for patterns in their respective phenomena. The fact that 
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there are fractals in language and in the natural world is such an example (Ellis & Larsen–
Freeman, 2006; Larsen–Freeman, 2017a).9 
But posthumanism has implications for applied linguists that exceed the search for 
common patterns. While it is easier to reject human exceptionalism when it comes to the 
agency of living nonhumans (Cook, 2015), it might make some uneasy to extend agency to 
nonliving material systems. Perhaps the strongest stance regarding agency and the 
intertwining of the physical and human systems comes from Hofkirchner (2012): 
I would like to paraphrase Jesper [Hoffmeyer] by saying that ―(. . .) the 
universe is perfused with all kinds of agents–all of which are capable of 
generating and using signs according to the stage they happened to reach so 
far in the course of evolution. Such agents might be material systems that 
organize themselves, or living material systems, or human living systems.‖ 
(p. 119) 
 
<B>Agency and the New Materialism 
Bruno Latour (2005) has challenged modernity‘s fundamental distinctions, such as the 
one between human and nonhuman. Certainly, the way that we speak in English alludes to  
agency in nonhuman, material objects (de Bot, 2018, p.c.). In a well-known case in Chicago, 
it has been said that Jane Byrne was elected mayor due to a snowstorm. ―While we may be 
allowed to take for granted that the snow storm did not anticipate this result or have any 
intentions to bring it about it; nevertheless, it did leave its track in the web of American 
history‖ (Hoffmeyer, 1998, p. 36). 
If it seems far-fetched to consider a snowstorm agentive, there are applied linguists 
who are thinking along the lines of the posthumanism and the new materialism in the 
scholarship of Barad (2007). For example, Canagarajah (2018) and Hawkins (2018) both de-
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center human agency, and suggest that objects and other semiotic resources have agency in 
shaping messages, meanings, and understandings. In particular, Canagarajah discusses the 
representational power of objects in STEM fields and theorizes that objects in the 
environment have agency to shape human actors.   
The conveniences of the modern world allow us to witness and benefit from the fact 
that ―[t]hings mediate, actively shape, and constitute our ways of being in the world and of 
making sense of the world‖ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 44, cited in Clowes, 2018). Nowhere is this 
truer than with technology (also foregrounded in the DFG‘s article)—and our increasing 
reliance on it. At the very least, ―[h]uman beings use material culture to bring new aspects of 
themselves into being‖ (Clowes, 2018).   
However, saying things mediate human activity is different from saying that things 
have agency in human worlds. Deacon (2012) makes the point that ―the apparent agency of 
the computer is effectively just the displaced agency of some human designer‖ (p. 101). 
Pennycook (2018) usefully observes ―It is worth recalling that a posthumanist position does 
not aim to efface humanity but to rethink the relation between humans and that deemed 
nonhuman‖ (p. 457). So, here is where thinking inspired by CDST may be helpful. CDST 
encourages us to interrogate dichotomies such as that between human and nonhuman. 
Furthermore, I have written long ago about the challenge of drawing boundaries in a complex 
system. Since everything is interconnected, one might legitimately inquire as to where one 
system begins and another ends. One of the original systems thinkers, Gregory Bateson, asks 
us to consider where the boundary between the end of the blind man‘s cane and the world can 
be drawn. Bateson (1972) suggests that ―[t]he way to delineate the system is to draw the 
limiting line in such a way that you do not cut any of these pathways in ways which leave 
things inexplicable‖ (p. 465).   
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Certainly, the level of granularity at which one is contemplating an object will make a 
difference. At one level, I see a desk as a static object, on which I can lay my books and 
papers. At another level, we know from physics that my desk is composed of atoms in 
motion. At this level, my desk is certainly not inert. Yet, applying this advice to a spatial 
system may be easier to conceive of than one constituted in time. Still, complex systems are 
constituted both in space and time, and therefore, the same question of boundary-drawing 
pertains. For instance, unless one is a creationist, one understands that we all began in a 
primordial soup. Then, chemical interactions in the primordial soup began to self-replicate. 
From these interactions followed single-cell organisms which began to compete with one 
another for resources and have evolved into various life forms ever since. How should we 
account in this chain for the transition between sub-human and a personal subjective account 
of agency? We have seen that the reflexivity of humans and their intentional adaptability are 
thought to be distinguishing features when it comes to human agency. We can add to these 
the matter of having a choice. Humans can choose whether to conform to social norms or not; 
molecules cannot choose whether or not they should interact (Capra & Luisi, 2014, p. 307). 
Still, claiming that agency rests solely with humans remains an open issue. For instance, we 
need to consider the entanglement of quantum physics in which sub-atomic particles behave 
differently depending on whether they are observed or not. While I am not claiming that 
particles have the subjectivity of humans, their behavior suggests that simple dualisms 
between human and sub-human are not helpful in a complex world where all things are 
interconnected.  
Of course, de-centered causal pluralism is a characteristic of complex systems, and 
because of the interconnection of all things, objects can influence human behavior. If this is 
what is meant by the agency of objects, it is easier to accept. Moreover, I certainly 
acknowledge the mess that we humans have perpetrated on the rest of the globe in the 
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Anthropocene era. My reluctance to accept the agency of objects stems in part from what I 
observed earlier. We humans are meaning-making beings who interpret and attach personal 
meaning to events in our lives. 
Mercer (2018) writes: 
(. . .) humans exercise their agency to differing degrees in how they 
subjectively make meaning out of their experiences and their contexts, while 
in turn influencing and being influenced by them. This implies a need to move 
away from thinking of contexts and cultures as being monolithic external 
objective variables affecting an internal inner world. Instead, contexts and 
cultures are subjectively interpreted in terms of the meaning for individuals. 
Individuals are seen as being connected across time and space to multiple 
contexts, past, present and future. (p. 8) 
 
It may all come down, then, to how one defines agency. Is it about the capacity to act 
in the world, the definition I have been using? Is it about influencing human behavior? Or, is 
it something entirely different? What I can be unequivocal about is that my use of CDST has 
been helpful in my thinking, and, in particular, my ―thinking about the human world and its 
intersections with the natural world as involving dynamic open systems with emergent 
properties that have the potential for qualitative transformation‖ (Byrne, 2005, p. 98). 
 
<A>EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF LEARNER AGENCY 
I turn next to considering how education can support learner agency. I begin by taking 
up the seven perspectives that I have alleged render learners as nonagentive.
11 
First of all, 
there may be good reason to want to generalize across groups of learners. Patterns can be 
perceived at various levels of scale in a complex system. However, in light of the 
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characteristics of complex dynamic systems and the research it has informed, it is not 
difficult to see the fact that complex systems following unique paths takes issue with the 
claim of language acquisition orders that all learners adhere to. Operating from a CDST 
perspective, Lowie and Verspoor (2015) put it thusly: 
If we are interested in grand sweep effects that may be generalizable to large 
populations of learners, we will have to carry out group studies with 
representative samples that can be analyzed using Gaussian statistics based 
on the normal distribution. But if we are interested in how an individual 
learner progresses over time as a result of changing variables in a changing 
context, we will have to conduct longitudinal studies and use nonlinear 
methods of analysis. (p. 63)  
Indeed, while allowing generalizations at the level of the group, sample-based 
research does not tell us about individuals. Van Geert (2011) warns: 
(. . .) models based on aggregated data from individuals have no logical bearing on 
models of individual processes. Molenaar (2008) calls this the ergodicity principle. 
He and his collaborators have shown that the implicit step, so common in the 
behavioral sciences, from sample-based research to individual process statements 
is often demonstrably incorrect. (p. 275)  
Furthermore, entertaining a complexity theory perspective, educational researchers 
Moss and Haertel, 2016) state that  
[t]he same outcome may be generated in more than one way, so any theory 
needs to account not just for complex causes, but also for multiple complex 
causes. Further, similar mechanisms may lead to different outcomes as they 
interact with different features of the context (p. 208).  
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Thus, the nonlinearity and multicausality of the process argues against pedagogical 
treatments inevitably leading to particular learning outcomes for all learners 
(Larsen–Freeman, 2006b). In addition, the distributed control of a complex systems 
calls into question any characterization of learners as passively yielding to an 
authority or outside force, even one such as socialization.  
Moss and Haertel (2016) continue as follows: 
Central to these contextual features are the understandings, choices, actions 
and interactions of the people involved. ―Human agency informed by meaning 
is absolutely part of the causal nexus‖ (Byrne, 2013, p. 221). These are shaped 
by their past histories and relationships within and across contexts as well as 
the social structures and institutions within which they live and work. (p. 208) 
Given the complicated histories that individuals bring with them to learning and using 
a language, it is not hard to understand how by placing them in categories, we miss 
out on all the intra-category differences that make them unique.  
As far as the teleological view of language is concerned, CDST posits that 
language is a complex adaptive system without end (Ellis & Larsen–Freeman, 2009). 
And, it also dismisses native speaker privilege because language as a complex 
adaptive system is realized in, and affected by, different contexts. Thus, there can be 
no one usage that is universally privileged, independent of purpose and audience 
(Larsen–Freeman, 2018a).   
Much more could be said about these seven perspectives, but let me move on to the 
implications for educators which are implicit in these challenges. For after all, as the DFG 
asserts, the teacher‘s influence on learners is considerable. Given the definition of language 
learner agency with which I began this article (―optimizing conditions for one‘s own learning 
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and choosing to deploy one‘s semiotic resources to position oneself as one would wish in a 
multilingual world‖), I ask now what our responsibility as educators is. 
 
<B>Teaching Practices: Optimizing Conditions for Language Learning 
Elsewhere, I have recommended language teaching practices, which have been 
influenced by my CDST thinking —such as teaching iteratively, not repetitively, and 
teaching students to adapt their language resources to changing situations (Larsen–Freeman, 
2014). Regardless of which practices are adopted, it is right to ask how a particular practice 
fits with who we are and who our students are. Given the complexity of the changing spatial–
temporal context with different actors and different sociohistorical backgrounds and 
orientations to agency, ‗best practices‘ need to be carefully vetted; instead, practices that are 
maximally adaptable find favor in CDST (Larsen–Freeman & Freeman, 2008).  
Applied to [language] education, Biesta (2007) observes:  
(. . .) the question for teachers is not simply ‗what is effective‘ but rather ‗what 
is appropriate for these [students] under these circumstances.‘ This means, he 
argues, ‗that inquiry and research can only tell us what is possible—or, to be 
even more precise, they can only show us what has been possible. [They] can 
tell us what worked but cannot tell us what works.’ (p. 16) 
 
In addition, it is commonly recognized these days that there is a changing reality in 
education:  
The reality is that people of all ages, and especially the mobile young, are 
managing to communicate across cultures and languages because they want to 
and need to, making use of prior knowledge, language acquired on-line or 
through the media and electronic translation tools‖ (King, 2017, p. 34).  
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Learner agency hardly needs to be encouraged according to this scenario. Learners are 
already optimizing conditions for their own learning (Larsen–Freeman, 2018b). 
 Even within the classroom, conditions for language learning can be enhanced through 
technology. For instance, Italian Studies at the University of Pennsylvania is reinvigorating 
their curriculum through language learning technologies, OER (Open Educational 
Resources), and individual performance assessment (Veneziano Broccia, 2018). Others have 
suggested using the Second Life virtual world with students to afford students an opportunity 
to take on a new identity and voice.  
In a ―porous classroom,‖ the teacher and students investigate the language together. 
Framed in this way, ―[t]he language classroom ceases to be the place where knowledge of 
language is made available by teacher and materials for learners and becomes the place from 
which knowledge of language and its use is sought by teacher and learners together; the 
classroom walls become its windows‖ (Breen, 1999, p. 55). An application of this approach 
can be found in the SKILLS (School Kids Investigating Language in Life and Society) 
(http://www.skills.ucsb.edu/) program (Bucholtz, 2013) in California public schools. This 
program encourages students to metapragmatically reflect on the relationship between 
language and identity (e.g., how are Ebonics speakers positioned compared with those who 
speak Standard English?). 
 
<B>Teaching Practices: Helping Students to Enact and Enhance Their Agency 
There is another angle to take on the question of teaching practices for optimal 
learning, and that is the question of how teachers can help their students to enact and enhance 
their agency. One way is by implementing learner-driven feedback, where learners ―drive‖ 
the feedback dialogue by asking for specific feedback. The feedback is given by the teacher, 
but learners decide how and on what they receive feedback. For example, students can choose 
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―between various modes of feedback: in-text corrections, correction symbols, handwritten 
feedback, email, audio recording, or face-to-face consultation‖ (Maas, 2017, p. 129). 
Drawing on Archer‘s (2003) influential theory of agency, Gao (2013) makes a case 
for enabling language learners‘ agency through reflexive/reflective thinking and sees 
learners‘ narratives as supporting this thinking when teachers dialogue with learners about 
what the learners have written. Biesta and Tedder (2007) also suggest the use of narratives, 
but with a somewhat different purpose—for learners to become aware of their agentic 
orientations and how they play out in the achievement of agency. 
Again, we encounter the idea that agency is to be achieved. If this is so, then one must 
ask which practices will help learners to achieve greater agency. It would seem that teacher–
student relationships are critical in terms of cultivating learner agency. Teachers normally 
have the power to ―determine the types of activities and resources to which learners will be 
given access and the opportunities they will have to engage in the activities and it is usually 
teachers who do the assessing‖ (DFG, 2016, p. 33). However, learner agency may be more 
sustained when teachers ask themselves, ―Who gets to ask questions?‖ ―Who gets to remain 
silent, and in which ways do some learners in my class choose to use silence?‖ (see, for 
example, Bao, 2014). It has been observed that well-intentioned teachers can teach in a 
culturally sensitive manner and still enable racism (Gholson & Wilkes, 2017). How can 
implicit bias be eliminated? Deborah Ball, in her Presidential Address to the American 
Educational Research Association (2018), asserts that  
Teaching is dense with discretionary moments (. . .) We usually draw on our 
experience; however, we have the power of teaching to disrupt racism and 
promote justice (. . .) by developing a repertoire of practices and ways that 
counter normalized practice (n.p.).  
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And, in terms of assessment, rather than asking if learners transfer what they have been 
taught, teachers could be asking what connections learners are making for themselves 
(Larsen−Freeman, 2013). 
Teaching practices that can lead to learning of language and practices that contribute 
to learners‘ achieving greater agency can only succeed if there is an openness to 
transformation on the part of both teachers and learners. Complexity theorist Ricca (2012) 
makes this very clear: 
All [interactions] involve mutual influence. It has been said that teachers must 
know their students, but usually what is meant is not that the teacher is to be 
transformed, but rather that the teacher can, by knowing her or his students, 
more efficiently move the students to a desired understanding. However, a 
complexity approach suggests not only that attempts such as efficiency are 
misplaced, but also requires that teachers must be transformed by their 
students as a result of the mutual influence of teachers and students. (p. 43) 
Without a commitment to mutual transformation, learning on both sides of the desk will be 
less optimal. 
 
<B>Teaching Practices: Supporting Learners in Choosing to Deploy Their Semiotic 
Resources to Position Themselves as They Would Wish in a Multilingual World 
A much-discussed practice these days to address this goal is the use of 
translanguaging in the classroom, or at least creating a place where students are not silenced 
because they cannot draw on all their language resources in the classroom. Obviously, learner 
agency is not fully appreciated when learners are seen to be mere hosts of another language 
(Kroskrity, 2004). Instead, it is essential to appreciate that learners have the capacity to create 
their own patterns with meanings and uses (morphogenesis) and to expand the meaning 
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potential of a given language, not just to internalize a ready-made system (Larsen–Freeman, 
2012b). In truth, learners actively transform their linguistic world; they do not merely transfer 
previous patterns and conform to it (Larsen−Freeman, 2013). However, learners have to see 
that they have options from which to choose (e.g., Larsen−Freeman, 2002a). 
Of course, teachers may need to enforce normative practices, depending on the goals 
for learning. As Sealey and Carter (2004) point out, ―one of the properties of languages is that 
they enable mutual intelligibility among their speakers, which means that innovation is 
always constrained by the need to be understood‖ (p. 273). Teachers do need to make 
learners aware of the consequences of the linguistic choices learners make. However, 
language is not a closed system (see Ortega, 2019, this issue), and there is, in fact, no 
linguistic basis for distinguishing a linguistic innovation from an error (Larsen–Freeman, 
2016) because both are contingent upon the speakers‘ perception of, and acting on, the 
affordances in the context to create meaning and to position oneself in a manner one wishes, 
engaging in the agentive process of audience design by tailoring their messages to 
interlocutors and other audiences (LaScotte & Tarone, 2019, this issue; Larsen–Freeman, 
2019). Knowing this may make it possible to ―disrupt understandings‖ of what constitutes an 
error, and become more accepting of what is essentially a creative process (Bouchard, 2018; 
Elder–Vass, 2014). 
 
<A>ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEYOND THE CLASSROOM 
Considerations of learner agency do not end in the classroom. The year 2018 marked 
the 50th anniversary of the publication of Paulo Freire‘s (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
and its central message is that there can be no individual emancipation without social 
emancipation (Biesta & Tedder, 2007, p. 133). The DFG article also reminds us of a need to 
make an ethical commitment (Ortega, 2005) of the sort that Ortega (2019, this issue) writes 
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about concerning grassroots multilingualism and the multilingualism of marginalized and 
minoritized communities. But what kind of ethics is required? Kramsch and Zhang (2018) 
identify two types, based on a distinction by Ricoeur: an ethics of conviction (norms and 
duties) and an ethics of responsibility. While, of course, teachers must abide by the norms of 
the institutions in which they work, CDST asks educators to take seriously an ethics of 
responsibility. 
[A] complexity perspective does not diminish the need for people to take 
responsibility for their actions; if anything, it increases the urgency of 
accepting that responsibility (. . . S)elf-organization and the emergence of 
order in complex systems are ethically-neutral processes; it is people who 
must impose and apply ethics to these processes, recognizing how a decision 
in one part of a system can affect other parts and ripple outwards to other 
connected systems‖ (Larsen–Freeman & Cameron, 2008, p. 77). 
 
In summarizing existing research on agency, van Lier (2008) claimed that there are 
three central characteristics when it comes to agency in language classrooms: the learner‘s 
ability to self-regulate, the socially mediated nature of sociocultural context, and an 
awareness of one‘s responsibility for one‘s own acts.  
Sullivan and McCarthy (2004) expressed a similar sentiment in their appeal to 
Bakhtinian dialogism: 
Perhaps the most significant feature of agency in the context of experience is 
the reflexive awareness of our own agency (. . .) It is this reflexivity that 
brings with it a sense of morals in our dialogues with the other. That is, we 
have some choice in how we author the value of another. As such, we have a 
sense of making the right choices, of making ethically particular choices that 
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will enrich the other. This points us towards an aesthetic account of agency 
that puts potentiality and responsibility at the centre of inquiry. (p. 307) 
With regard to valuing others and relating to them, it is perhaps naïve but a hopeful 
thought nevertheless, to imagine, in an era of neonationalism and neoliberalism in which a 
larger segment of the population is experiencing what it is like to feel their sense of agency 
compromised, that this era will ultimately be transformative, at least in engendering empathy 
with those who have long experienced their agency similarly. 
 
<A>CONCLUSION 
 
 It is not surprising, given the exigencies of the modern world, that ―agency‖ has 
attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. I have been especially concerned for a long time 
that the agency of language learners has not always been respected in SLA theories. Second 
language learners are not mere processors of input, nor are they mere products of 
socialization. Further, teaching does not cause learning. It is fairly common practice with 
studies of individual differences, such as those having to do with motivation or attitude, to 
treat all members of a group so designated as if they were homogeneous, and thus overlook 
their particularity. Then, too, ideologies can lead to deficit views of learning and can demean 
language users. In addition to challenging these portrayals, I sought to expand upon the 
treatment of agency in the DFG article, and to suggest that the individual interacting with the 
environment is an appropriate level of granularity—indeed, a necessary one—if 
understanding the uniqueness of learning trajectories is the goal. I also hoped to better 
understand where research on learner agency and research on second language development 
intersect and perhaps to encourage the adoption of a discourse that would allow the 
conversation between the two groups of researchers to be facilitated. 
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To address these aims, I appealed to the transdisciplinary CDST, a relational 
ecological systems theory, which maintains that one cannot fully understand one part of a 
complex system, if one does not look at its relationship with another or others—internal to 
the system and external to it. Using CDST, I endorsed the interdependence of structure and 
agency, all the while characterizing agency as relational, emergent, spatially, and temporally-
situated. In addition, I proposed that agency is not something possessed, but achieved by an 
individual, orienting to the different affordances of the social and material worlds. Agency 
changes through iteration and adaptation. It is multidimensional and heterarchical. These 
qualities were then used to challenge the perception of second language learners as 
nonagentive. 
I also have also taken up the issue, increasingly being discussed in today‘s 
posthumanist intellectual climate, of whether it is only humans and other sentient life forms 
that have agency. While certainly my intuition would suggest that objects do not, given the 
reflexivity, intentionality, adaptability, ability to choose, and subjectivity of humans, I 
nevertheless think that the case is not an open and shut one, particularly when the temporal 
dimension is considered, and I expect to hear more from the new materialists in the future. 
Moving on, I pointed to how education can support learner agency, as long as educators are 
discerning when it comes to adopting and adapting ―best practices.‖ Nevertheless, I did make 
teaching suggestions in three categories: those that optimize language learning by 
recognizing learner agency, those that seek to enhance learner agency, and those that support 
learners in deploying their semiotic resources as they wish. Finally, I called for embracing an 
ethics of responsibility, so that we become aware of our own agency, and we can make 
choices about how we value and relate to others.  
One final thought, stimulated by my reading of Sullivan & McCarthy (2004) as they 
draw on Bakhtin‘s dialogical approach, is that  
 34 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
acknowledging our own uniqueness and responsibility brings us beyond the 
traditional categories that inform analysis of agency (. . .) the poor, the 
wealthy, the educated, the alienated and so on to focus on agency as it is 
experienced by particular people in the dialogical moment in which self meets 
other‖ (p. 297).  
It is in precisely that moment that the ethics of responsibility is imperative. CDST, in 
connecting the different levels of a complex system, keeps active what is specific about 
individuals and their actions. Our ethics must be recruited and committed to better 
understanding these (Larsen–Freeman & Cameron, 2008, p. 226). 
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NOTES 
1
. Deters (2011) helpfully distinguishes identity and agency, and Gao (2013) does the same 
for autonomy and agency. For instance, Gao cites Benson (2007) as positing agency as ―a 
point of origin for the development of autonomy‖ (Gao, 2013, p. 227). 
2
. I, myself, have contributed to some of these. 
3
. When we categorize people, we lose sight of their humanity. At the 2018 Silfen Forum, 
University of Pennsylvania President Amy Gutmann said, ―At its core, immigration is about 
the fate of millions of individual people—refugees, DACA recipients, etc. yes—but 
individuals with lives, families (. . .)‖ 
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4.
 I will not here go into the question of whether we are conscious of agentive moves or not. 
Interested readers can consult Larsen–Freeman & Cameron (2008) and Al-Hoorie (2015) for 
discussion. 
5.
 A designation, which Kumaravadivelu (2016), frustrated by the inequity in native-
speaker/nonnative speaker discourse, has extended to the entire nonnative speaking 
community. 
6.
 Juarrero (2000) uses the term ―heterarchy,‖ differently from the way I am using it. She 
states that ―students of complex dynamical systems have coined the neologism ‗heterarchy‘ 
to allow inter-level causal relations to flow in both directions, part to whole (bottom up) and 
whole to part (top down).‖ 
7.
 I know from previous experience how difficult it is to portray a complex dynamic system 
through a static medium. See Larsen−Freeman & Cameron‘s (2008, p. 168) attempt to show 
interacting timescales and levels of organization. 
8.
 A complication is that Complexity Theory is associated with ―agent-based modeling,‖ a 
computational approach to the study of complex systems; however, this association with 
agency stems from ―restricted complexity‖ (Morin, 2007), not the ―general complexity‖ that I 
am discussing here (see Morin, 2007, for the distinction). 
9.
 ―[I]n 1996 the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, (which 
included nonlinear scientist Prigogine) reported and advocated breaking down the division 
between ‗natural‘ and ‗social‘ science through seeing both characterized by ‗complexity‘‖ 
(Urry, 2005). 
 
10.
 A diminished view of individual agency is limited still further by the idea that agency 
springs from reflection on action rather than from action itself. Although the findings have 
been challenged, in a well-cited study by Wegner and Wheatley (1999), people were asked to 
move their limbs but also had their brains stimulated to induce involuntary movements; they 
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were equally likely to believe the stimulated, involuntary movements to be the result of 
conscious decisions as the voluntary movements. As Gibbs (2006, pp. 22–23) says, ―[R]esults 
such as these call into question the simple idea that the conscious self is always the author of 
one‘s bodily action.‖ 
11.
 In the interest of brevity, I will rely on quotations from colleagues, which I have used 
before in various publications, most recently in 2017b. 
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